I was liaison to all of the programming side of the house, O-90 and O-9, at that level. I sat in on the deputy program review committee (DPRC) meetings, the two-star level on the programming side of the house. But in fact in the spring of 1982 there was a connection, and that connection was me. Irv Blickstein said in his interview there was no connection between plans and policy, and the programming side of the house. I was going to be the OP-06 liaison to the programming side of the Navy staff. I was there for maybe 3-4 months when I got called up and told by Admiral Moreau himself that he had a new job from me. I had had a previous tour at 06 and had a tour on the Joint Staff and Moreau wanted me back in OP-06. When I arrived in the Pentagon and checked in, I was told I wasn’t going to 965, I was going back to OP-06, because Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau who was OP-06 at the time had told the bureau that I was coming back to 06.
I went back to OPNAV in January of 1982, on completion of a three-year tour in command of USS Bigelow (DD-942). What was your role in OPNAV when the Maritime Strategy got started? Johnson discusses how the strategy had to quickly come together to inform Navy programming, how it was received in its initial briefings by senior leadership, and how the Soviet Union reacted to the Maritime Strategy toward the end of the Cold War. CIMSEC discussed the 1980s Maritime Strategy with Captain Spencer Johnson (ret.), who was instrumental in assembling the first briefed iteration of the Maritime Strategy in 1982.
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